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Outbreaks of influenza A (H3N2, A/Shanghai/11/87-like) occurred in two partially (60% and 79%) vaccinated nursing home populations in January 1988. A retrospective cohort study using chart review was designed to assess the effectiveness of influenza vaccination and amantadine prophylaxis (100 mg per day) in controlling the outbreaks and to determine the amantadine susceptibility of influenza viruses isolated from casepatients. The point estimate of vaccine efficacy in preventing influenza-like illness was -33% (95% confidence interval -115% to 18%). However, 9% of vaccinated casepatients died within 14 days after onset of influenza-like illness compared with 26% of unvaccinated case-patients (relative risk = 0.4, 95% confidence interval 0.1 -1.0). There was no significant difference in illness severity among case-patients who became ill before amantadine prophylaxis was started (n = 84) compared with those who became ill while taking amantadine (n = 34). Four virus isolates obtained before amantadine prophylaxis was started demonstrated 52-68% inhibition by 1 M9/ ml of amantadine; by comparison, six isolates (resistant viruses) obtained from residents who became ill while taking amantadine demonstrated 1-18% inhibition. The resistant viruses had four different RNA sequences in the gene coding for the M2 protein transmembrane region. Three resistant viruses with identical RNA sequences were isolated from residents living in contiguous rooms who had onset of signs and symptoms during a 6-day interval. Further studies are needed to determine how frequently and under what circumstances resistant viruses occur when antiviral agents are used to control institutional influenza A outbreaks. Strategies for antiviral agent administration that limit the emergence and transmission of resistant virus strains may be needed. Am J Epidemiol 1991 ;134:988-97.
amantadine; antiviral agents; drug resistance; influenza vaccine; nursing homes; orthomyxovirus type A, human Type A influenza virus infections can cause substantial morbidity and mortality in elderly persons. Elderly nursing home residents are at particular risk because of the potential for sustained virus transmission in a closed living environment. Currently avail-able measures for prevention and control of influenza A in nursing homes include vaccination with inactivated influenza vaccine and chemoprophylaxis and treatment with antiviral agents (1) . Two antiviral agents, amantadine and rimantadine, have been demonstrated to be effective in the prevention and treatment of influenza A infections (2, 3) . Amantadine has been available in the United States since 1966; however, it was not widely used to control institutional influenza A outbreaks until the mid-1980s. Rimantadine is currently being investigated for use as an alternative to amantadine (4) (5) (6) .
The use of antiviral agents to control institutional influenza A outbreaks has raised concern about the possible emergence and transmission of resistant virus strains. Resistant influenza A viruses have been demonstrated to emerge readily in vitro in the presence of amantadine (7) (8) (9) and in animals treated with amantadine (10, 11) . Prior studies in humans have documented emergence of resistant viruses in children (12) (13) (14) (15) and young adults (15) who were receiving rimantadine treatment. Transmission of resistant viruses has been observed in animal studies (11, 16) , and appeared to occur among humans in household settings (12, 15) .
During the 1987-1988 influenza season, we investigated outbreaks of influenza A (H3N2, A/Shanghai/ 11/87-like) occurring in two partially immunized nursing home populations. For control of the outbreaks, amantadine prophylaxis was offered to all residents and employees in the nursing homes. In this report, we present data regarding the effectiveness of influenza vaccination and amantadine prophylaxis in controlling the outbreaks and the results of amantadine-susceptibility tests in viruses isolated from patients who developed signs and symptoms of influenza infection while taking amantadine.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS

Case-finding and definitions
During January 1988, outbreaks of an acute respiratory illness, typically characterized by abrupt onset of fever and cough, occurred in eastern Wisconsin among residents and employees of nursing homes A (230 residents) and B (395 residents) and were reported to the Wisconsin Division of Health. Nursing home A is a 252-bed, skilled, long-term care facility with a central dining room and patient activity rooms on each of five units. Nursing home B is a 398-bed, skilled, long-term care facility with two main dining rooms for patients requiring minimal assistance and seven auxiliary dining rooms for patients requiring more intensive care. Patient activity rooms are provided on each of the nine units in the facility. Shared accommodations are provided for most residents at both facilities. Our investigation of the outbreaks was limited to illness occurring among residents at these nursing homes. At the time the outbreaks were reported and after the outbreaks were over, the medical records of all residents living at the facilities during the outbreaks were reviewed to assess demographic characteristics, case status, severity of illness, influenza vaccination status, and required level of nursing care.
A case of influenza-like illness was defined as an illness characterized by fever (>38.0°C oral or >38.3°C rectal) and at least one sign or symptom of cough, coryza, or sore throat, occurring in a nursing home resident between December 15, 1987 and March 15, 1988 . Measures of illness severity assessed in case-patients included the presence of lower respiratory tract signs, hospitalization, and mortality. A case-patient was considered to have lower respiratory tract signs if there was evidence of pneumonia on a radiographic examination of the chest or if the presence of rales, dyspnea, or a respiratory rate of 30 breaths or more per minute was recorded in the patient's medical record during the illness. Hospitalizations and deaths were considered to be related to influenzalike illness if they were respiratory or cardiac related, occurred within 2 weeks after onset of influenza-like illness, and had no apparent alternative explanation. Deaths that occurred within 60 days after onset of influenza-like illness were also considered to be potentially related to the illness. Influenza vaccination status was defined on the basis of receipt of the influenza vaccine formulated for the 1987-1988 influenza season, consisting of A/Taiwan/1/86 (H1N1), A/ Leningrad/360/86 (H3N2), and B/Ann Arbor/1/86 hemagglutinin antigens. Required level of nursing care was assessed on the basis of Title 42 medicare guidelines (17) .
Age was not determined for nine residents in nursing home A and for 10 residents in nursing home B, influenza vaccination status was not determined for two residents in nursing home A and five residents in nursing home B, and required level of nursing care was not determined for two residents in nursing home A and 41 residents in nursing home B.
Outbreak control measures
After influenza A was recognized as the probable cause of the outbreaks, amantadine prophylaxis (100 mg per day) was offered to all residents and employees at the facilities. Compliance with this regimen among residents was assured since residents who were prescribed amantadine were observed to take the medication by nursing home personnel. Amantadine treatment (100 mg per day) was administered to all case-patients who had signs and symptoms of influenzalike illness. Additional control measures included the limitation of visitors and curtailment of new admissions.
Vaccine and amantadine efficacy
We calculated vaccine efficacy for the interval prior to initiation of amantadine prophylaxis (before January 18, 1988 for nursing home A and before January 19, 1988 for nursing home B). To minimize the chance that influenza-like illness was associated with infections other than influenza, we excluded cases that occurred before January 5 in nursing home A (n = 7) and before December 26 in nursing home B (n = 5) from this analysis (early cases). We assessed amantadine efficacy by determining illness severity among case-patients who became ill prior to initiation of amantadine prophylaxis compared with those who received amantadine treatment within 2 days after their onset of influenza-like illness and those who became ill while taking amantadine prophylaxis. For this analysis, early cases and cases occurring after amantadine prophylaxis was discontinued were excluded. Each nursing home was considered as a separate stratum for calculation of pooled relative risk estimates. The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square test (18) was used for significance testing, and confidence intervals were calculated by using the formulas of Robins et al. (19) . Results of the Mantel-Haenszel calculations were used to obtain estimates of vaccine efficacy (20) .
Laboratory methods
Paired serum specimens and throat swab specimens were requested from all residents who were recognized by nursing home staff as having signs and symptoms of influenzalike illness after the outbreaks were detected. Paired sera were tested for complement fixation antibody to a series of viral respiratory pathogens including influenza A and B; parainfluenza 1, 2, and 3; respiratory syncytial virus; and adenovirus. An infection was considered to be laboratory confirmed if a fourfold or greater antibody titer rise was demonstrated between paired serum specimens or if a virus was isolated from a throat swab specimen.
Throat swab specimens were placed in veal infusion broth, refrigerated, transported to the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene within 48 hours, and inoculated into primary monkey kidney tissue cells. Standard influenza virus isolation procedures were utilized (21); primary tissue culture passages were quick frozen in a dry ice and alcohol bath, stored at -70°C, and shipped on dry ice to the World Health Organization Collaborating Center for Influenza, Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia After shipment, all viable influenza viruses were tested for strain type using a hemagglutination-inhibition assay with ferret antisera, and for susceptibility to amantadine by using an enzyme-immunoassay test modified from that described previously (22, 23) . Prior to testing, viruses were passed once or twice in Madin-Darby Canine Kidney cells and once or twice in embryonated eggs.
All amantadine-and rimantadineresistant viruses isolated to date have been associated with a genetic change in virus RNA corresponding to a single amino acid change at positions 27, 30, 31, or 34 in the M2 protein transmembrane region when compared with sensitive influenza A viruses (8, 9, 22, 24) . Therefore, enzymeimmunoassay results were confirmed by comparison of the RNA sequence of the M2 protein transmembrane region of the outbreak isolates with that of an influenza A virus known to be sensitive to amantadine (A/NY/83) (22) . Prior to nucleotide sequence determination, influenza virus RNA was prepared from egg-grown influenza viruses as described previously (25) . An oligonucleotide primer complementary to A/ New York/83, RNA segment 7, nucleotides 742-757 (CTATCAGAAACGAATG) was synthesized by the Biotechnology Facility at the Centers for Disease Control by using standard phosphoramidite chemistry (26) . Buffers and gradient conditions used are described elsewhere (27) . The M2 region of influenza virus RNA segment 7 was sequenced with this primer and reverse transcriptase using the dideoxynucleotide chaintermination method as described previously (28, 29) , and corresponding amino acid sequences were deduced.
RESULTS
Resident characteristics
The characteristics of residents living in nursing homes A and B, respectively, at the time of the outbreaks were similar with respect to age (mean age ± standard deviation: 79.1 ± 13. 
Observed effects of amantadine administration
Amantadine prophylaxis was administered to 211 (92 percent) of 230 residents and 139 (69 percent) of 202 employees at nursing home A beginning on January 17 and to 359 (91 percent) of 395 residents and 186 (56 percent) of 334 employees at nursing home B beginning on January 18. At the time amantadine prophylaxis was started, amantadine treatment was administered within 2 days after onset of influenza-like illness to 10 patients at nursing home A and to 10 patients at nursing home B. During the 30-day interval of amantadine prophylaxis, influenza-like illness occurred in 20 (10 percent) of 191 residents at nursing home A and 14 (4 percent) of 338 residents at nursing home B who did not have influenza-like illness before amantadine prophylaxis was started (figure 1). Laboratoryconfirmed influenza A infections were demonstrated in four (67 percent) of six casepatients at nursing home A and in eight (73 percent) of 11 case-patients at nursing home B who had specimens available for testing. All case-patients who had onset of signs and symptoms after amantadine prophylaxis was started were taking amantadine during illness onset.
When stratified for vaccination status, illness severity was similar among casepatients who became ill prior to initiation of amantadine prophylaxis, those who received amantadine for treatment of influenza-like illness, and those who had onset of influenza-like illness while taking amantadine prophylaxis (table 1) . However, although not statistically significant (p = 0.2, one-tailed Fisher's exact test), none of 11 vaccinated case-patients who received amantadine for treatment of influenza-like illness died within 60 days after illness onset, compared with eight (15 percent) of 54 vaccinated casepatients who did not receive amantadine treatment (table 1) .
During the 2-week interval after amantadine prophylaxis was discontinued in the nursing homes, one case of influenza-like illness occurred at nursing home A and eight cases occurred at nursing home B (figure 1). These nine late cases were detected during the record review process, and no specimens were obtained from case-patients.
Amantadine resistance testing
Ten influenza A virus isolates were tested for amantadine resistance. Four isolates obtained from residents before amantadine prophylaxis was started demonstrated 52-68 percent inhibition by 1 Mg/ml of amantadine (sensitive viruses); by comparison, six isolates obtained from residents who were taking amantadine during onset of their illnesses demonstrated 1-18 percent inhibition (resistant viruses) (table 2) .
None of the four sensitive viruses demonstrated any nucleotide sequence changes in the virus gene coding for the M2 protein transmembrane region compared with a control sensitive virus (A/NY/83); however, all of the six resistant viruses demonstrated a point mutation in RNA resulting in an ami no acid change (table 2). Three resistant viruses had the same point mutation resulting in a change from valine to alanine at position 27. One resistant virus had a change from alanine to threonine at position 30, one had a change from alanine to valine at position 30, and one had a change from serine to asparagine at position 31.
Of the six resistant viruses, one was isolated from a vaccinated resident at nursing home A, and five were isolated from vaccinated residents at nursing home B. One of these case-patients developed lower respiratory tract signs, but none were hospitalized or died. The three resistant viruses with identical amino acid changes were isolated from case-patients who lived in contiguous rooms and who shared the same 30-person dining room on unit 1 (figure 2). These three patients had onset of signs and symptoms on PRO* LEU* VAL* VAL ALA* ALA SER* ILE* ILE GLY*
* AP, amantadine prophylaxis; PRO, proline; LEU, leucine; VAL, valine; ALA, alanine; SER, serine; ILE, isoleucine; GLY, glycine, ASN, asparagine; THR, threonine.
t Date of onset of signs or symptoms of influenza infection in a patient. $ Percent inhibition by 1 jig/ml amantadine. § -indicates no change in ammo acid sequence when compared with control virus. days 4, 6, and 9 after amantadine prophylaxis was started. Eight of 14 cases that occurred in nursing home B during the interval of amantadine prophylaxis and 10 of 11 cases that occurred during the 3-day interval on or before the date amantadine prophylaxis was started also developed in residents living on unit 1 (figure 2).
DISCUSSION
Influenza vaccination can reduce the incidence and severity of influenza A infections occurring in nursing home residents (30) , and herd immunity can be induced by achieving high levels of vaccination coverage (greater than 80 percent) when there is a Amantadine-resistant Influenza A (H3N3) 995 good match between vaccine and epidemic virus strains (31, 32) . However, influenza outbreaks can occur in institutional settings despite high levels of vaccination coverage among residents and may be particularly common when substantial antigenic drift occurs between circulating virus strains and vaccine strains. During the 1987-1988 influenza season, there was sufficient antigenic drift between circulating influenza strains (A/Shanghai/ 11/87-like) and the corresponding vaccine strain (A/Leningrad/360/ 86) to warrant changing the vaccine strain for the subsequent year (33) .
The Immunization Practices Advisory Committee to the US Public Health Service has recommended administration of amantadine to all residents of a facility as soon as an influenza A outbreak is recognized (1) . In several published outbreak-related studies (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) and many unpublished outbreak investigations reported to the Centers for Disease Control, amantadine prophylaxis was apparently effective in aborting institutional influenza A outbreaks. Furthermore, reports of substantial influenza A virus transmission after initiation of amantadine prophylaxis in institutional settings, as occurred during these outbreaks, are rare.
During these outbreaks, vaccinated casepatients who received amantadine treatment were less likely to die compared with vaccinated case-patients who did not receive amantadine treatment. Although not statistically significant, this finding supports experimental observations in birds in which the combination of amantadine treatment and vaccination has been demonstrated to reduce mortality associated with influenza A infection (16) . Moreover, the combination of rimantadine prophylaxis and vaccination may have had an additive effect in preventing influenza-like illness in humans (39) .
Although use of amantadine might have been effective in reducing influenza Arelated mortality in the nursing homes, resistant viruses readily emerged during the interval of amantadine administration. All influenza A viruses that were isolated from case-patients who were taking amantadine at the onset of their illnesses, and were tested for amantadine susceptibility, were amantadine resistant. Transmission of resistant viruses also may have occurred, since resistant influenza A viruses with identical genetic changes were isolated from three residents living in adjacent rooms who had onset of signs and symptoms during a 6-day interval.
Previous studies have documented the emergence of resistant viruses only during rimantadine administration. However, the mechanism of resistance for both amantadine and rimantadine is likely to be the same. All amantadine-and rimantadineresistant viruses isolated to date have been associated with a genetic change in virus RNA corresponding to a single amino acid change at positions 27, 30, 31, or 34 in the M2 protein transmembrane region when compared with sensitive influenza A viruses (8, 9, 22, 24) . Of the five amino acid changes previously reported in association with amantadine or rimantadine resistance in the medical literature, four were found in resistant viruses isolated during these two nursing home outbreaks.
In these outbreaks, resistant viruses may have emerged either in case-patients who received amantadine treatment at the time other persons in the facility received prophylaxis or in patients or employees who had incubating influenza A infections at the time they began receiving amantadine prophylaxis. Resistant viruses have previously been demonstrated to emerge in patients who received rimantadine for treatment of influenza A infections and were apparently transmitted to other family members (12, 15) . In future investigations, the relative importance of residents, employees, and possibly visiting family members in the emergence and transmission of resistant viruses needs to be determined.
The public health importance of amantadine-and rimantadine-resistant influenza A virus strains has not been fully determined. Results of surveillance to date have demonstrated no spontaneously occurring resistant viruses (12) , and there has been speculation that the continual selection of antigenic variants may prevent the widespread emergence of resistant influenza A virus strains (13, 22) .
Further studies are needed to determine how frequently, and under what circumstances, resistant viruses emerge when antiviral agents are used to control institutional influenza A outbreaks. If results of these studies indicate that resistant viruses emerge frequently, strategies to limit the transmission of these viruses may be needed. These strategies may include isolation from others in the facility of persons who receive antiviral agents for treatment of influenza A infections or who develop signs or symptoms of influenza infection while taking amantadine prophylaxis (1) . Aggressive implementation of other available influenza prevention and control strategies may also limit the emergence and transmission of resistant viruses. Early outbreak detection and immediate intervention may limit the emergence and transmission of resistant viruses since the number of persons who need to receive antiviral agents can be reduced if outbreaks are limited to a level in which ill residents and employees can be isolated from others. In addition, achievement of high levels of influenza vaccine coverage among both residents and employees can reduce or prevent transmission of influenza A and preclude the need for antiviral agents.
